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"The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree
in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or
if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard
it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very
palladium of free government." - Alexander HamiltonI
I. THE JURY AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION
The Framers of the United States Constitution developed a political
system to protect American citizens against tyranny. To guard against
tyranny by a minority, the Framers adopted a system of majority rule. To
protect against tyranny of the majority, they developed an elaborate sys-
tem of checks and balances in which political power and authority were
split among various political institutions.2 This framework, coupled with
the Bill of Rights added to the Constitution during the first session of
Congress, created a limited government that flows from the popular sov-
ereignty of the American citizenry and at the same time protects that
sovereignty.
After Alexis de Tocqueville traveled throughout America, he compiled
his insights on the still new American political system in the classic De-
mocracy in America. At the end of his discussion of "what tempers the
tyranny of the majority,"'3 Tocqueville distinguished the jury system as a
political institution as compared to a judicial one. In terms of the jury's
role in "facilitat[ing] the good administration of justice," he acknowl-
edged, "its usefulness can be contested."'4 But in terms of the jury as a
political institution, he insisted that it "should be regarded as one form of
the sovereignty of the people."'5 The jury system provided a means by
which the American citizenry could participate in and make decisions re-
garding the political system: "[T]here is always a republican character in
it, inasmuch as it puts the real control of affairs into the hands of the
ruled, or some of them, rather than into those of the rulers."'6 For Toc-
queville, the jury's role represented as important an expression of popu-
lar sovereignty as voting.7
Tocqueville also noted that the use of the jury system is "bound to have
a great influence on national character" and that such "influence is im-
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) [hereinafter FEDERALIST 83].
2. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
3. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270-76 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
HarperPerennial Books 1988) (1840) (Part I, Chapter 8).
4. Id. at 271 (noting that this characterization is particularly true for the jury in civil
cases). Tocqueville also observed, "I do not know whether a jury is useful to the litigants,
but I am sure it is very good for those who have to decide the case." Id. at 275.
5. Id. at 273.
6. Id. at 272.
7. See id. at 273 ("The jury system as understood in America seems to me as direct
and extreme a consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the people as universal
suffrage. They are both equally powerful means of making the majority prevail.").
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measurably increased the more [juries] are used in civil cases."'8 Among
the ways in which Tocqueville saw the jury system enhancing the national
character:
* "Juries, especially civil juries, instill some of the habits of the judi-
cial mind into every citizen, and just those habits are the very best
way of preparing people to be free."9
* "It spreads respect for the courts' decisions and for the idea of
right throughout all classes." 10
* "Juries teach men equity in practice. Each man, when judging his
neighbor, thinks that he may be judged himself."11
* "Juries teach each individual not to shirk responsibility for his
own acts, and without that manly characteristic no political virtue
is possible. '12
" "Juries invest each citizen with a sort of magisterial office; they
make all men feel that they have duties toward society and that
they take a share in its government. '13
* "Juries are wonderfully effective in shaping a nation's judgment
and increasing its natural lights. That, in my view, is its greatest
advantage."14
* "I regard it as one of the most effective means of popular educa-
tion at society's disposal." 15
For Tocqueville, jurors were more than just participants in the legal pro-
cess. They served as a vital component of the American political system.
Let us now fast-forward approximately two centuries from the framing
of the Constitution and Tocqueville's travels. The American experiment
in guarding against tyranny has proved successful, and the country has
grown up from the youthful nation that Tocqueville experienced. One
change that has accompanied America's growth is that the jury system's
role as a political institution seems to have receded into the back-
ground.' 6 Instead of the positive benefits that the jury system provides,
news stories on juries focus more on their excesses and the ways in which
jurors pervert the legal process. Most Americans probably are familiar
with the jury that awarded $2.7 million to an elderly woman who, after
spilling coffee on herself, sued McDonald's for serving the drink too
hot' 7; or with the jury in Florida that arguably ignored the judge's instruc-
8. Id. at 274.





14. Id. at 275.
15. Id.
16. See Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and
Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 332 (1995) (noting a power shift from
juries to judges manifested through procedural mechanisms such as special verdicts and
directed verdicts).
17. See Suit Says McDonald's Hot Pickle Left Scar, Los ANGELES TIMES, October 8,
2000, at A27 ("a judge later lowered the award to about $500,000, and the parties report-
edly settled for a lesser amount").
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tions in awarding $145 billion in a suit brought against tobacco compa-
nies.' 8 Juries are often seen as out of control and in need of being
reigned in.
As hinted at by the reference to the McDonald's and tobacco litigation,
this criticism is levied largely against the use of juries in civil proceedings.
But it is not a recent development. Tocqueville's words of praise aside,
ever since the days of America's Founding and continuing today, many
have questioned the need for juries in civil cases. If the jury system does
help educate the citizenry and "gives them added confidence in democ-
racy," as Judge Jerome Frank asked, "[c]an that contention be proved?
Do not many jurors become cynical about the court-house aspects of gov-
ernment? And should education in government be obtained at the ex-
pense of litigants?"'19 For critics of the jury system, one of the best ways
to reign in juries would be to limit the role of the jury in resolving civil
disputes.20
In this article, we examine the current state of the jury system by con-
trasting the calls for restricting the authority that juries possess with the
system's seemingly forgotten political role. But before we discuss further
what this article is about, we need to acknowledge what it is not. First, we
will focus on calls to limit the jury's role in civil disputes, not criminal
cases. As noted below, both supporters and opponents of the Constitu-
tion at the time it was written acknowledged the need for popular partici-
pation in the judicial process where one party in the proceeding was the
government exercising its police authority over its citizens. 2' Such recog-
nition continues today as well.22
Second, and more importantly, this article is not about the proper con-
stitutional interpretation that should be afforded to the Seventh Amend-
ment, which preserved the right of trial by jury in suits at common law.2 3
That amendment has a well developed, if difficult to administer, doctrine
in which judges apply a historical test 2 4 "requir[ing] a court to compare
18. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Smokers Awarded Record $145 Billion in Lawsuit, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, July 15, 2000, at 1A; Mark Kaufman, Tobacco Suit Award: $145 Bil-
lion, WASH. POST, July 15, 2000, at A].
19. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 135 (1949). But cf. STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE
JURY: DISORDER IN THE AMERICAN COURTS 186 (1994) ("nearly three-quarters of those
who do serve come away with a more favorable view of the system than they had before").
20. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 19, at 108-145.
21. See FEDERALIST 83, supra note 1, at 499.
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1502 (1999) (In criminal cases, "[d]istrust of officials is too great in
America for people to be willing to entrust their liberty solely to professional judges")
[hereinafter "Posner Evidence"].
23. The Seventh Amendment reads: "In Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
24. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935) ("In order to ascertain the scope
and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of
the common law established at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in
1791").
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the right at issue to 18th-century English forms of action to determine
whether the historically analogous right was vindicated in an action at law
or in equity, and to examine whether the remedy sought is legal or equi-
table in nature. '25
Some commentators have written on the constitutional history of the
Seventh Amendment, 26 others about its political history.27 This article,
however, considers the Seventh Amendment as an expression of political
theory. We examine the political philosophy of the Federalists that
shaped the Constitution and, more importantly, the philosophy of the
Anti-Federalists, whose efforts ensured that the Constitution included the
right to a trial by jury in civil cases via the Seventh Amendment. In doing
this, we will tie the jury system's past with its present, and with a look to
the future.
In the next section, we consider the philosophical understanding that
both the proponents and opponents of the Constitution held regarding
the jury's position in the American political system. In Section III, we
analyze the results of a survey of federal and Texas state court trial judges
to understand their views on whether the use of trial by jury in civil cases
should be restricted. Finally, in Section IV, we tie together the historical
discussion with the current data to assess what role the jury system can
and should play in the modern American political system.
25. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 574
(1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987) ("characterizing the relief sought is more important
than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of action" (internal quotations omit-
ted)); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
The second clause of the Seventh Amendment (supra note 23), the reexamination
clause, also has developed its own lineage of jurisprudence. This clause historically had
limited the scope of appellate review of trial court decisions pertaining to a jury's findings;
for example, "appellate review of a federal trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a
jury's verdict as excessive . . . was once deemed inconsonant with the Seventh Amend-
ment's Reexamination Clause." Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,
434 (1996) (citing Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436, 437-438 (1994); Williamson v. Osenton,
220 F. 653, 655 (4th Cir. 1915)). Over time, however, the power of appellate courts under
the reexamination clause has expanded in reviewing such matters as a jury's assessment of
damages, a trial judge's determination that the jury's "verdict is not contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence," a judge's findings in a bench trial based on documentary review,
and trial judges' discretionary decisions on interlocutory procedural matters. Charles Alan
Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 778 (1957)
(Professor Wright's classic treatment of the subject). For a review of more recent develop-
ments, see Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-36 (Section III(B) of the majority opinion); id. at 441-
47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Amy McCullough, Comment, Gasperini v. Center for Humani-
ties: Clarifying Federal Appellate Review or Judicial License in Tort Reform?, 32 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 853, 855-70 (1998). Finally, the most recent Supreme Court decision assessing the
scope of the reexamination clause is Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tools Group, Inc.,
_ U.S. __, 2001 LEXIS 3520, *25 (2001) ("Because the jury's award of punitive damages
does not constitute a finding of 'fact,' appellate review of the District Court's determina-
tion that an award is consistent with due process does not implicate ... Seventh Amend-
ment concerns").
26. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973); Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966).
27. See Dooley, supra note 16, at 349-361; cf. Hans Zeisel, The Debate over the Civil
Jury in Historical Perspective, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 25 (1990).
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II. THE FOUNDING DEBATE: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE
ANTI-FEDERALISTS
A. OVERVIEW: UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHIES
2 8
The creation of the new Constitution in 1787 was a compromise of ide-
als and strategies. The main goal of the Constitutional Convention was to
find a way to fix the Articles of Confederation and to end the trade wars
among the states. It quickly became evident to the Founding Fathers that
merely amending a system that was already defunct would lead to more
difficulties. Under this guise, the Founders sought to forge a new path-
way, one that would alter the very understandings of some of the key
concepts that drove American philosophy and culture at the time. They
wanted a system that would draw upon the beliefs of Montesqieu, Locke,
and Hobbes to create a new conception of the word "federal" and craft
two spheres of power. This challenge was not an easy one. Several mem-
bers of the Convention left in protest once this new order of business was
posed. The Constitution itself was a series of compromises regarding the
size of the republic, how representation would function, what human na-
ture really is like, what the power and role of government should be, and
who should control the power. The Founding Fathers present at the craft-
ing of this new Constitution would become its ardent advocates-the
Federalists. Those who took differing opinions to the very foundations of
the constitutional design would ally themselves in opposition-the Anti-
Federalists.
The Federalists and Anti-Federalists had differing understandings of
the most basic concepts that would underlie the new design. These differ-
ences (summarized in Table 1) would lead to what many have referred to
as the "Founding Debate," which continues to echo in the very discus-
sions surrounding the issue discussed herein.
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF FEDERALIST AND ANTI-
FEDERALIST POSITIONS ON KEY CONCEPTS
FEDERALISTS ANTI-FEDERALISTS
Size of Republic Large Small
Representation Filter Mirror
Human Nature Selfish Virtuous
Power/Role of Government National Centered State Centered
Power Lies with ... Elite Yeomentry
28. See generally THE FEDERALIST; THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) [hereinafter AF
PAPERS]; HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981).
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1. Size Of Republic and the Power/Role of Government
At the time of the Founding, a republican form of government had long
been seen as needing to be small in order to be successful. This way those
in the republic would feel a part of the process and share in its govern-
ance. The Federalists knew this argument and used it as a means for con-
tending that their new conception of federalism, where the states and the
national government each would have their own sphere of power, would
make this larger republic possible. The Anti-Federalists held fast to the
idea that, even in an expanded notion of a republic, without the contin-
ued close attachment of the people to the localities they would become
distrustful of government.
The government formed under the new Constitution was "limited" and
kept from being abused by those involved through a system of checks and
balances and separation of powers. As Madison noted in Federalist No.
51, "If men were angels, no government would be necessary."' 29 The Fed-
eralists were satisfied that this new limited government would provide the
balance necessary between parochial and national needs. It too would
offer the necessary protections for citizen rights while providing for the
"common good." The Anti-Federalists feared this arrangement and wor-
ried that the new national government would become too large and too
remote for the governed to feel attached. The new national government
would grow through the Necessary and Proper and Supremacy Clauses,
thus making the states a mere puppet of federal control. Further, this
limited-government plan did not mention specific protections for the citi-
zens, and this silence for the Anti-Federalists called into question their
existence under the new plan. The Federalists stated these rights were
commonly understood; the Anti-Federalists harkened back to a system
that the fledging nation had just liberated itself from and argued that
without clear guarantees meaning can get lost.
2. Representation, Human Nature, and Power Lies With...
The Federalists countered that, in the representative democracy where
the governed would relinquish some of their authority under popular sov-
ereignty to the government and in turn their representatives, all would be
heard. The representatives would not merely do the governed's bidding,
but would "filter" the public passions into what would be best for the
common good. The Federalists' understanding here was bolstered by
their arguments that ultimately through the electoral process the power
would reside with the people to determine who their representatives
would be. Their underlying notion of human nature, however, was of
self-interest. People could not be trusted to seek the common good, but
rather would be out for themselves. Parochial interests would tear apart
the new government, like it had the Articles of Confederation, if there
were not a representative structure. This notion is built on not only hav-
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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ing representatives of the people govern, but also having different kinds
of governing structures: the Senate to balance the House, the three
branches of the federal government to balance each other, the electoral
college to balance the popular presidential vote, and the federal govern-
ment to balance the state governments. The Federalists, however, looked
to the white, male landowner to vote. They saw other elites like them-
selves as future representatives and governing decision makers.
The Anti-Federalists, although not opposed fully to these concepts,
raised issues with how each would come about. First, representation for
them should be more about mirroring the will of the people. After all, if
the representatives lost track of what the public desired, they would not
be doing their jobs effectively. Second, the Anti-Federalists had more
trust of human nature. Through education and participation they felt that
humans could nurture their virtuous selves. They also felt it should not
be the elite, but rather the middle class-the yeomentry-who would
make the best representatives. The yeomentry were in better touch with
what the community was like. They could better judge the problems fac-
ing the nation given their middling status. Third, the Anti-Federalists
also were concerned about this new layer of government. While not op-
posed to the notion of having a federal government, their concern for the
detachment people would feel from this remote entity might cause grave
problems. They feared this detachment undermined the Federalists' core
assumption of the need for participation and popular sovereignty. The
Anti-Federalists saw the potential for the Federal government as not only
a means for taking away power from the local and state governments, but
also leading to the populous becoming complacent or at worst turned off
to governing.
As these different core issues demonstrate, although the Federalists
eventually won the debate with the ratification of the new Constitution,
the Anti-Federalists raised key concerns that continue to drive much of
today's political context. One such concern of particular note here is the
Anti-Federalists' insistence that the first order of business of the new gov-
ernment be the passage of a series of protections. The Anti-Federalists
had enough clout in key states (e.g., George Clinton in New York) to
prevent, or at least impede, the ratification of the new Constitution.
Thus, the Federalists gave in to the demands to enumerate some of the
limitations of the new government. The first ten protections, later
dubbed the Bill of Rights, incorporated some of the key protections for
citizens in our republic and laid the foundation for the limitation of the
federal government. 30 The relevant provision for our purposes here is
the right to trial by jury in civil cases. Its importance needs to be assessed
30. These amendments originally were intended to protect individuals' rights vis-A-vis
the national government. Most, but not all, of these protections have been incorporated
into the Fourteenth Amendment and now apply to the states as well. One notable excep-
tion of a right that has not been incorporated is the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by
jury in a civil case. See infra section III.D.
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within the context of the Founding Debate and the key arguments that
the Anti-Federalists put forth.
B. DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE JURY SYSTEM IN CIVIL CASES
The right to trial by jury in civil cases was not a new conception at the
Founding; Blackstone considered it as "the glory of the English law." 31
The Founders, particularly the Anti-Federalists, borrowed this conception
as a means for assuring representation of the public in the new judiciary
structure and fortifying the educational and participatory elements they
deemed so vital to keep the people engaged in government. More impor-
tantly though, the Anti-Federalists deemed this existence of the trial by
jury so important because beyond participation, the public's role here
placed a check on the governing elite (i.e., in this case the judges) and
placed the public in the role of conferrer of legitimacy. The Anti-Federal-
ists argued that if popular sovereignty meant anything then in order for
the new judiciary, powerless to implement its own decisions, to have au-
thority among the general public, it would need the public's support and
veneration. The Federalists, as it will be noted below, had difficulty fend-
ing off this line of reasoning and thus we have the jury provisions con-
tained in the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution. 32
As written, the original Constitution did not include any provision re-
garding the use of the jury system in civil disputes. 33 The Anti-Federalists
often cited this omission as one of the many defects of the proposed Con-
stitution.34 One of the common lines of attack that Anti-Federalist writ-
ers used was that the lack of protection in Constitution indicated that the
trial by jury in civil disputes had been eliminated or, at a minimum, had
the potential to be eliminated by Congress.35 To this argument, the Fed-
eralists countered that the Constitution did not abolish the trial by jury,
but instead gave Congress the flexibility to determine the scope of the
31. Quoted in Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
32. The Sixth Amendment deals with jury trials in criminal cases and, as noted at the
outset of this article, is beyond our scope.
33. Article III, section 2 did provide for trial by jury in criminal cases.
34. See, e.g., Centinel, No. 1 (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in AF PAPERS, supra note 28, at
236 ("and that trial by jury in civil cases is taken away) (emphasis in original); The Address
and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constitu-
ents (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in AF PAPERS, supra note 28, at 239 ("That in controversies
respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial by jury shall remain as here-
tofore, as well in the federal courts, as in those of the several states").
35. See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Speech (June 5, 1788), reprinted in AF PAPERS, supra note
28, at 202 ("How does your trial by jury stand? In civil cases.., this best privilege is gone:
But we are told that we need not fear, because those in power being our Representatives,
will not abuse the powers we put in their hands: I am not well versed in history, but I will
submit to your recollection, whether liberty has been destroyed most often by the licen-
tiousness of the people, or by the tyranny of rulers? I imagine, Sir, you will find the bal-
ance on the side of tyranny.").
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jury system over time.36 Another defense that the Federalists employed
was that the scope of the use of trial by jury varied among the states and
that, therefore, the federal government should not impose a singular sys-
tem.37 The Anti-Federalists retorted that the jury system was of such cen-
tral importance that the general principle could and should be preserved
within the Constitution.38
These arguments, Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike, appear to be
more partisan in nature-that is, they were geared more toward the spe-
cific issue of ratifying the Constitution.39 They do not, in themselves, re-
flect the philosophical basis underlying each side's view of the proper role
of the jury in the American political system.40 Such views are summa-
rized in the quotation from Alexander Hamilton at the start of this arti-
cle. But to understand them more fully, one must turn to Federalist No.
83 and the Anti-Federalist writings of the Federal Farmer.
In Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton distinguished between the
use of a jury in a criminal proceeding and in a civil dispute. Hamilton saw
the connection between the jury in a criminal trial and the preservation of
liberty. In that context, the jury would be an important check on the
government against arbitrary proceedings and convictions. 41 Civil cases,
however, do not present a situation in which the government is exercising
its powers against the citizens. They are by definition disputes between
two private interests with a government official-the judge-serving as a
36. See FEDERALIST 83, supra note 1, at 509 ("I suspect it to be impossible in the
nature of the thing to fix the salutary point at which the operation of the institution ought
to stop, and this is with me a strong argument for leaving the matter to the discretion of the
legislature").
37. Id. at 507 ("It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any gen-
eral regulation that would be acceptable to all the States in the Union, or that would per-
fectly quadrate with the several State institutions").
38. See, e.g., Federal Farmer, Arguments for a Bill of Rights (Jan. 20,1788), reprinted in
LE'rERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 109 (Walter Hartwell Bennett
ed., The Univ. of Ala. Press 1978) ("it is the jury trial we want; the little different append-
ages and modifications tacked to it in the different states, are no more than a drop in the
ocean: the jury trial is a solid uniform feature in a free government; it is the substance we
would save, not the little articles of form") [hereinafter FEDERAL FARMER]; Thomas Jef-
ferson, Letter to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF
RIGHTS 320 (Gordon Lloyd and Margie Lloyd eds., Univ. Press of Am. 1998) (arguing that
it would be better to establish the "general right" of having a trial by jury than the "general
wrong" of not providing for it in the Constitution).
39. See Wolfram, supra note 26, at 668 ("It is difficult to escape the feeling the that
'bill of rights' and 'civil jury trial' issues ... were . . . make-weight arguments designed
mainly to stimulate public opposition to the Constitution"); Paul D. Carrington, The Sev-
enth Amendment Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 34-36 (1990)(examining "the political origin of the Seventh Amendment").
40. Cf. Wolfram, supra note 26, at 668 ("But an appreciation of the possible 'political'
motive which caused many of the antifederalists to raise the civil jury trial issue should not
be permitted to obscure the constitutional significance of public reaction to the issue").
The same argument applies to understanding the impact of the Anti-Federalists' political
philosophy had on shaping the Seventh Amendment.
41. See FEDERALIST 83, supra note 1, at 499 ("Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary
methods of prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary con-
victions have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of judicial despotism; and these
have all relation to criminal proceedings").
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neutral party; they do not pose a threat to personal liberty. Thus, the
Federalists did not consider juries in civil disputes to be a vital component
in preserving liberty.
The jury system's usefulness in civil proceedings lay primarily as a
check against corrupt judges: "the trial by jury must still be a valuable
check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies the impediments to its suc-
cess."' 42 "Here then is a double security;" Hamilton wrote, "and it will
readily be perceived that this complicated agency tends to preserve the
purity of both institutions. By increasing the obstacles to success, it dis-
courages attempts to seduce the integrity of either. '43 Thus, the use of a
jury allows the judicial system to operate more honestly. But, for Hamil-
ton, this did not equate to being a fundamental hallmark of a free, repub-
lican government.
Hamilton tended to view the jury as a legal institution. The Constitu-
tion granted Congress the power to constitute inferior courts, and within
this power was the ability to determine the scope of the jury system.44
The Hamiltonian perspective became the predominant view of the jury
during the nineteenth century as the jury system fell "from virtual omnip-
otence to near subjugation. '45 Of the explanations offered for the jury
system's decline during the 1800s, all reflect the Federalist philosophic
understanding of the government they had created: the passions of the
citizenry should be tempered by formal structures and the filtering of the
public good through the calm deliberations of the governing elite.46
42. Id. at 501.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 496 ("A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of
trial; and consequently, if nothing was said in the Constitution on the subject of juries, the
legislature would be at liberty either to adopt that institution [the trial by jury] or to let it
alone").
45. Dooley, supra note 16, at 354.
46. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. Dooley summarizes previous explana-
tions for the jury's decline and then proffers one of her own. Dooley, supra note 16, at
354-56. These explanations include: that the law of science, with an emphasis on uniform
and predictable rules, began to emerge; that the temporal distance from English colonial
oppression and the increase of well-trained judges reduced the need for juries to check
against corrupt judges; and that the jurors' passions may lead them to find against large
corporate interests and thus counter the nation's movement toward industrialization.
Dooley's explanation is that juries "had become a dangerous vehicle for upsetting the sta-
tus quo"; as democratic social movements opened up the political process to greater num-
bers of previously excluded groups, including women and minorities, the movement
toward judge-controlled decision-making became more prevalent.
Like the first clause of the Seventh Amendment, the reexamination clause also has been
interpreted over time in a manner that has moved away from the jury as a predominant
institution. See supra note 25. The specific mechanisms used and case law effecting this
movement have been addressed by other authors; see, e.g., Wright and McCullough, both
cited supra note 25. For purposes here, the important issue to mention is that, as with the
interpretations afforded to the Seventh Amendment's first clause, the changes in the reex-
amination clause's meaning reflect the Hamiltonian perspective regarding the balance be-
tween the judiciary and jury system. Hamilton believed that the federal judicial system
should be given the flexibility to adapt its procedures to changing times (although Hamil-
ton believed that the power to alter the federal judiciary rested with Congress). See supra
note 36. Interpreting the reexamination clause to grant more power to appellate courts
generally exhibits this view.
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Although the Federalists won the battle for ratifying the Constitution,
the Anti-Federalists' views have been called the "philosophy of ... the
Bill of Rights. '47 The Federal Farmer 48 provided the most extensive writ-
ings setting forth the philosophical basis for the Anti-Federalists' insis-
tence on a Constitutional protection of the trial by jury even in civil
cases. 49 At the heart of the Anti-Federalists' views was that the jury sys-
tem, as a political institution, was on par with a representative legislature
for ensuring freedom. "Representation, and the jury trial, are the best
features of a free government ever as yet discovered, and the only means
by which the body of the people can have their proper influence in the
affairs of government. '50
The jury system provided ordinary people a voice in the affairs of the
government; they did not have to be part of the ruling elite to make deci-
sions that would affect the community. 51 After all, according to the Fed-
eral Farmer, "[tihe body of the people, principally, bear the burdens of
the community; they of right ought to have a controul in its important
concerns, both in making and executing the laws, otherwise they may, in a
short time, be ruined. '52 In addition, the jury system allowed citizens to
learn about how to govern themselves as well: "Their situation, as jurors
and representatives, enables them to acquire information and knowledge
in the affairs and government of the society; and to come forward, in
turn, as the centinels and guardians of each other. '5 3
The Federal Farmer's arguments reflect the special role of the jury in
the American political system. Juries offer an invaluable connection be-
tween the government and the governed. The jury is the most direct ex-
pression of popular sovereignty and communal values within the political
system. Here, the will of the people is not filtered through their repre-
sentatives. It is not subject to compromise between competing factions
47. William Hartwell Bennett, Preface to FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 38, at vii.
48. Scholars traditionally have considered Richard Henry Lee to be the Federal
Farmer. See William Hartwell Bennett, Editor's Introduction to FEDERAL FARMER, supra
note 38, at xiv. But some recent historians have begun to question this. See Gordon S.
Wood, The Authorship of the Letters from this Federal Farmer, 31 WILLIAM AND MARY
QUARTERLY 299, 300 (1974). One possible alternative is that Melancton Smith penned the
Federal Farmer's works. See Ralph Ketcham, Editor's Note in AF PAPERS, supra note 28,
at 257.
49. For an additional overview of the Antifederalists' conception of the civil jury's
role, see Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Sev-
enth Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 148-156 (1991).
50. Federal Farmer, The Struggle Over Ratification of the Constitution II (Dec. 25,
1787), reprinted in FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 38, at 43.
51. "It is essential in every free country, that common people should have a part and
share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative department. To hold open to
them the offices of senators, judges, and offices to fill which an expensive education is
required, cannot answer any valuable purposes for them." Federal Farmer, Organization
and Powers of the Proposed Government I1 (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in FEDERAL FARMER,
supra note 38, at 29.
52. Federal Farmer, The Judiciary (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in FEDERAL FARMER,
supra note 38, at 102.
53. Federal Farmer, Organization and Powers of the Proposed Government II (Oct. 12,
1787), reprinted in FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 38, at 29.
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within the walls of the legislature. The Anti-Federalists recognized the
benefit both to the government and to the citizenry in promoting this
form of the general populace's involvement, albeit a limited one, in deter-
mining public affairs.
The Anti-Federalists also recognized that the jury played an important
role within the judicial process as well. The jury system provided legiti-
macy to this process and to judges' authority54, a role that was not lost on
Tocqueville either during his travels: "civil cases have established the au-
thority of the English or American judge... [t]hus the jury, though seem-
ing to diminish the magistrate's rights, in reality enlarges his sway, and in
no other country are judges so powerful as in those where the people
have a share in their privileges."'55 Moreover, according to the Federal
Farmer, although the general public might not possess the necessary legal
skills to make detailed legal judgment, they had the ability to understand
core principles of the law and apply those principles to community
values.56
The Antifederalists' desire to preserve the jury system in civil cases
extended beyond preserving that right only in the first instance. If a
jury's expression of popular sovereignty were to have its full meaning, the
jury's findings of facts as well as its general verdict could not be disturbed
on appeal.5 7 This "most noble and important principle of the common
law"58 was threatened, however, by the language of the original Constitu-
tion, which granted the Supreme Court "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact." 59 For the Antifederalists, this language's potential for al-
54. "If the conduct of judges shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the
laws, and change the forms of government, the jury may check them, by deciding against
their opinions and determinations, in similar cases." Federal Farmer, The Judiciary (Jan.
18, 1788), reprinted in FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 38, at 102.
55. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 3, at 276.
56. "It is true, the freemen of a country are not always minutely skilled in the laws, but
they have common sense in its purity, which seldom or never errs in making and applying
laws to the condition of the people, or in determining judicial causes, when stated to them
by the parties." Federal Farmer, The Judiciary (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in FEDERAL
FARMER, supra note 38, at 102.
57. See id. ("I hold it the established right of the jury by the common law, and the
fundamental laws of this country, to give a general verdict in all cases when they chuse to
do it, to decide both as to law and fact, whenever blended together in the issue put to them.
Their right to determine as to facts will not be disputed, and their right to give a general
verdict has never been disputed . .
58. Id. at 101.
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Antifederalists attacked this provision. For example,
Brutus, a noted critic of the Constitution's provisions for the judiciary, contended:
[T]he superior tribunal will re-examine all the facts as well as the law, and
frequently new facts will be introduced, so as many times to render the cause
in the court of appeals very different from what it was in the court below ....
Who are the supreme court? Does it not consist of the judges? And they are
to have the same jurisdiction of the fact as they are to have of the law. They
will therefore have the same authority to determine the fact as they will have
to determine the law, and no room is left for a jury on appeals to the supreme
court.
Brutus, No. XIV, reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, at 235 (Morton Borden ed.,
1965) (1788) (included as part of Borden's Antifederalist No. 81) (emphasis added); cf.
Ralph Ketcham, Editor's Note in AF PAPERS, supra note 28, at 269 ("Brutus takes particu-
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lowing an appellate court to ignore a jury's factual decisions bordered on
"despotic principles" and endangered the fundamental role of the jury.60
Therefore, the Antifederalists pressed for the new Constitution to pro-
vide for both an individual's right to trial by jury in a civil case and for
limitations on appellate reexamination of facts presented at trial.
Because of the many benefits it provided, the jury system was some-
thing to be honored, not disdained: "The jury trial, especially politically
considered, is by far the most important feature in the judicial depart-
ment in a free country, and the right in question is far the most valuable
part, and the last that ought to be yielded, of this trial."'6' Perhaps fore-
shadowing the modern debate regarding the scope of the jury system, the
Federal Farmer noted, "I am very sorry that even a few of our country-
men should consider jurors and representatives in a different point of
view, as ignorant troublesome bodies, which ought not to have any share
in the concerns of government. '62 For the Anti-Federalists, these views
threatened the very foundation of the freedom for which the American
colonists fought England to obtain.
III. THE JURY AT THE NEW MILENNIUM: ANALYZING HOW
JUDGES VIEW THE JURY SYSTEM IN CIVIL
DISPUTES
A. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
We turn now from the theoretical discussion of the philosophical views
of the Framers to a more concrete issue: whether the use of jury should
be restricted. To do this, we shall use the comprehensive survey of fed-
eral and Texas state court trial judges undertaken by the Dallas Morning
News and the SMU Law Review Association. But we shall not leave the
Founding Debate altogether. Resonating throughout the questions and
responses in this survey can be found the tension regarding the role of
juries that Federalists and Anti-Federalists experienced.
lar pains, in Nos. XI-XV, to attack the wide powers and unrepublican tenure of the federal
judiciary").
Alexander Hamilton tried to counter the Antifederalists' re-examination arguments in
Federalist 81. See generally THE FEDERALIST 81, at 489-491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clin-
ton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1 contend therefore.. .that the expressions, "appellate jurisdiction, both as to
law and fact," do not necessarily imply a re-examination in the Supreme
Court of facts decided by juries in the inferior courts .... To avoid all inconve-
niences, it will be safest to declare generally that the Supreme Court shall
possess appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, and that this jurisdic-
tion shall be subject to such exceptions and regulations as the national legisla-
ture may prescribe.
Id. at 489-90 (emphasis in the original). Hamilton's arguments aside, the inclusion of the
re-examination clause in the Seventh Amendment reflects that the Antifederalists gener-
ally won on this particular issue.
60. Federal Farmer, The Judiciary (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in FEDERAL FARMER,
supra note 38, at 102.
61. Id.
62. Federal Farmer, Organization and Powers of the Proposed Government II (Oct. 12,
1787), reprinted in FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 38, at 29.
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Analyzing the opinions of trial judges regarding restricting the use of
juries in civil cases offers several important benefits. First, trial judges,
more than any other participant in the legal and political processes, un-
derstand the benefits and foibles associated with the jury system. They
see everyday a group of twelve (or fewer) otherwise ordinary individuals
come together to have a say in developing the rules that guide their com-
munity. But they also see the instances in which jurors, perhaps cor-
rupted by the power they hold, exceed their authority. Second, to the
extent that the scope of the jury system is changed, trial judges, as a col-
lective institution, will feel the most impact. On one hand, when the
power of the jury is restricted, trial judges most likely are granted the
power stripped away from juries. On the other hand, as Tocqueville
noted, to the extent that juries legitimize the authority of the judiciary
and of trial judges, if the jury system's scope were narrowed, that might
affect the judiciary's legitimacy. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
the decision to restrict a jury's authority usually is made on a case-by-case
basis by judges themselves using tools such as Judgment as a Matter of
Law. Thus, understanding how the surveyed judges view the role of ju-
ries will provide an indication of the future of the jury system.
Table 2 presents selected responses to survey questions regarding the
judges' assessment of how well the jury system works.63 These results
show that, on average, judges and juries likely will reach the same result
in any given case. Almost unanimously, judges responded that they
would reach the same verdict as the jury all or most of the time. Judges
generally think that jurors are competent to analyze evidence, are neutral
at the outset of a civil case, and do not greatly abuse their positions.
63. Cf Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1063
(1964) ("When one asserts that jury adjudication is of low quality, he must be asserting that
jury decisions vary in some significant degree from those a judge would have made in the
same cases. If he denies this and wishes to include the judge, he has lost any baseline, and
with it any force, for his criticism.").
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Do you think the jury system is ... fine the way it it ... [or]
is in good condition/needs minor work 91.1% 87.8%
With the continuing debate over tort reform and ADR, do
you believe that ... the jury system is fine 67.8% 62.5%
How often do you agree with jury verdicts in your cases?..
All of the time [or] most of the time 96.8% 95.9%
The right of individuals to have their civil disputes decided by
a jury needs to be ... left the same 66.5% 71.4%
In general, how well do you think the average juror
understands the legal and evidentiary issues in cases?...
Very well [or] moderately well 93.4% 83.9%
In general, how well do you think juries do in actually
reaching a just and fair verdict? . . . Very well [or] moderately
well 98.6% 98.3%
If you were personally a litigant in a civil case, how would
you prefer the dispute to be decided? ... By a jury 59.3% 57.9%
Coming into a civil case, do you think most jurors ... favor
neither side 81.6% 66.3%
Have you ever had what you consider a runaway jury? ... No 76.4% 76.3%
Do you believe you've had a jury use a verdict to send a
message about a broader, political, ethical or social subject?
... No 59.6% 52.8%
Table 2 also indicates that, as a general proposition, the average judge
in the survey believes that the jury system generally works most of the
time.64 Much like the general consensus in favor of the jury system dur-
ing the Founding, this survey indicates that the jury system at its core
remains an important and functioning part of the judicial process. Thus,
to the extent that the jury system may need to be reformed, any changes
would appear to be needed only at the margins of the system.
B. FUNDAMENTAL REFORM?
Based on this survey, the need for wholesale changes to the jury system
would not have support of a majority of judges. Nevertheless, a signifi-
cant minority of the judges surveyed would seem to support a fundamen-
tal reform on the jury system, specifically by limiting its scope in civil
cases. One question in the survey asked the following:
64. If there is one area that may run counter to this general proposition, it is the issue
of awarding damages. When asked whether they "ever decreased/eliminated a verdict on
compensatory or punitive damages because you didn't believe it was based on fact or law,"
62.5% of federal judges answered yes, but only 23.7% of Texas judges responded
affirmatively.
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The right of individuals to have their civil disputes decided by a jury
needs to be:




Left the Same 395 281
No Answer 7 7
Thus, nearly one-quarter (24.3%) of the judges believe that the role of
the jury in civil cases should be reduced or eliminated.
This proposition-reducing an individual's right to a jury trial in a civil
case-represents more than just a marginal adjustment to the trial by
jury. This is a fundamental attack on the institution as it seeks to reduce
structurally the jury system's scope. The idea of restricting the right to
access a jury in civil disputes would be antithetical to the Anti-Federalists'
view. Because the jury system represents the "very palladium of free
government," restricting its use would in effect be a restriction on free-
dom. In addition, the Anti-Federalists saw a distinct class difference be-
tween the elite judges and the common people who would make up a jury
pool.65 Restricting or eliminating an individual's right to a jury trial in a
civil dispute would introduce a class bias into the judicial system.66 With
such a change, the system would lose its connection with the average citi-
zen and, as a result, its legitimacy would be weakened.
For the Federalists, restricting the use of the jury system in civil dis-
putes would not infringe on liberty, although eliminating it altogether
probably would. In fact, Federalists might support some restrictions. As
discussed above, the Federalists trusted the ruling elite, which presumably
included judges, to filter the passions of the citizens into the common
good. Thus, transferring power from the masses (the jury) to the elite
(judges), so long as the system provided sufficient checks on corrupt
judges, would be consistent with the rest of the governmental framework
the Federalists established. Furthermore, as Hamilton contended in Fed-
eralist No. 83, other means of answering questions that traditionally had
been determined by juries may arise, and the Constitution should allow
such methods to be used in lieu of the trial by jury.67 But these views do
65. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
66. "The few, the well born, &c. as Mr. Adams calls them, in judicial decisions as well
as in legislation, are generally disposed, and very naturally too, to favour those of their own
description." Federal Farmer, Organization and Powers of the Proposed Government II
(Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 38, at 29.
67. FEDERALIST 83, supra note 1, at 509 ("changes which are continually happening in
the affairs of society may render a different mode of determining questions of property
preferable in many cases in which that mode of trial now prevails ... I suspect it to be
impossible in the nature of the thing to fix the salutary point at which the operation of the
institution [the jury system] ought to stop, and this is with me a strong argument for leaving
the matter to the discretion of the legislature").
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not represent the philosophy of the Anti-Federalists, the philosophy of
the Bill of Rights, which secured the right to a jury in civil disputes.
The tenets of the Anti-Federalists' view regarding juries still exist today
and can be found within the survey of judges. For example, one survey
question asked the judges to characterize the proper role of the jury; one
of the responses-that the jury represented the "conscience of the com-
munity"-reflects a value very close to those of the Anti-Federalists. 68
Of the Federal judges, 29.6% listed "conscience of the community" as
one of their choices; for judges in Texas, this figures jumps to 46.6%.
Given this, the question arises: do the judges who believe that the jury
reflects the conscience of the community support restricting the right to a
trial by jury in civil disputes. One would expect that, generally, they
would not.
Table 3 breaks down support for restricting or eliminating the right to a
jury by whether the judge considered the jury as the community's con-
science. The survey responses were recoded to develop two dichotomous
variables. For the variable RESTRICT, if a judge answered that he or
she believed that the right to a jury should be reduced or eliminated, the
response was coded as "1"; otherwise the response was "0". Similarly, for
CONSCIENCE, if a judge indicated that he or she believed that the jury
represented the conscience of the community, that response was coded as
a "1", even if the judge selected other characterizations as well. Only if
the judge did not select "conscience of the community" at all was the
response coded as "0".
68. The question asked: "What do you see as the proper role of the jury?" The re-
sponses were "score-keepers," "truth-seekers," "conscience of the community," "arbiters
of justice," and "other." Judges were allowed to choose more than one response. The
responses broke down as follows:
Federal Judges Texas Judges
(n=594) (n=393)
Score-keepers 270 (45.5%) 194 (49.4%)
Truth-seekers 523 (88.0%) 333 (84.7%)
Conscience of the community 176 (29.6%) 183 (46.6%)
Arbiters of Justice 131 (22.1%) 97 (24.7%)
Other 30 (5.1%) 0 (0.0%)
No answer 4 (0.7%) 15 (3.8%)
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TABLE 3: SUPPORT FOR REDUCING/ELIMINATING THE
TRIAL BY JURY IN CIVIL DISPUTES BY WHETHER A JUDGE




CONSCIENCE 0 447 169 616
1 284 70 354
Total 731 239 970
X2 = 7.10587 Significance = 0.00768
Given the chi-square (X2) value, we can say that the expected relation-
ship between the two variables is statistically significant. Those judges
who view the jury as the conscience of the community generally do not
support restricting the use of the jury. Only seventy judges (7.2%) saw
the jury as the conscience and supported restricting its use. More com-
monly, if a response were coded as a "1" for either variable, then the
corresponding response for the other variable probably was a "0". Thus,
to the extent that the philosophy of the Anti-Federalists still sounds in
today's political and legal thinking, we can say that this philosophy still
would oppose restricting or eliminating an individual's right to trial by
jury in a civil dispute.
C. DEVELOPING A MODEL TO PREDICT A JUDGE'S POSITION ON
WHETHER TO RESTRICT OR ELIMINATE AN INDIVIDUAL'S
RIGHT TO A TRIAL By JURY IN A CIVIL DISPUTE
Given the importance of the jury system as an institution in America's
political system, the next question to consider is why a judge would sup-
port restricting or eliminating the trial by jury in civil disputes. To begin
to answer this, one should consider what characteristics might a judge
possess to lead him or her to hold this view. We turn again to the survey
responses and use a logistic regression model to develop this analysis. A
logistic regression model can be used when the dependent variable is di-
chotomous-that is, where the variable has only two values. In this re-
gard, we will use the dichotomous variable RESTRICT (see description
above) as the dependent variable. We shall use four independent vari-
ables in the equation70 :
69. Seventeen responses were omitted from this analysis because of missing
observations.
70. In selecting independent variables, we were limited to information contained in
the survey itself. On one hand, certain demographic variables in the survey (e.g., gender,
whether a judge's background was in private practice or public service) turned out to be
statistically insignificant in preliminary runs of the model. On the other hand, we believe
that other variables that could not be derived from the data set would have been useful.
For example, given the importance of farming interests underlying the Anti-Federalists'
views, we would have liked to include a variable somehow reflecting whether the judge
served in an agricultural or urban area. But we were unable to come up with a sufficient
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CONSERVATIVE: A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if the judge
characterized him- or herself as "conservative" and "0" for other self-
characterizations 71;
MESSAGE: A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if the judge believed
that he or she had a jury use a verdict to send a message about a broader
political, ethical, or social subject and "0" if not 72 ;
RUNAWAY: A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if the judge ever
had what he or she considered a runaway jury and "0" if not73 ; and
FEDSTATE: A dichotomous variable coded as "1" if the judge was a
federal judge and "0" if a Texas state judge. 74
Table 4 reports the results of this model.
TABLE 4: RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL
13 Standard Error Significance R
2
CONSERVATIVE 0.6066 0.1731 0.0005 0.1010
MESSAGE 0.3967 0.1615 0.0140 0.0633
RUNAWAY 0.6394 0.1763 0.0003 0.1053
FEDSTATE 0.6860 0.1778 0.0001 0.1132
Constant -2.1327 0.1968 0.0000 1
Model X2 = 44.880 Significance = 0.0000 N = 90275
Each of the independent variables is statistically significant and has a
positive beta coefficient. This reflects a direct relationship between each
variable and a judge's position on whether to restrict or eliminate an indi-
vidual's right to a jury trial in a civil dispute. Thus, a conservative judge is
more likely to support restricting this right, as are judges who have seen a
jury use a verdict to send a message or had a runaway jury. Finally, fed-
variable to measure this for both Federal and Texas judges. In preliminary runs of the
model using only Federal judges' responses, however, a variable along these lines turned
out to be significant.
71. One survey question asked: "How do you consider yourself in interpreting the
law?" Judges could respond "Conservative" [Federal = 128 (21.5%), Texas = 217 (55.2%)],
"Liberal" [Federal = 27 (4.5%), Texas = 6 (1.5%)], or Moderate [Federal = 388 (65.3%),
Texas = 160 (40.7%)]. In addition, 51 (8.6%) Federal judges and 10 (2.5%) Texas judges
did not answer this question. Trial versions of the model also included a dichotomous
variable reflecting whether the judge indicated if he or she were "moderate." Including
both CONSERVATIVE and the proposed MODERATE variable would have allowed us
to test the distinct impacts of each response-conservative, moderate, and liberal. The
MODERATE variable, however, turned out to be statistically insignificant, thus suggesting
that the primary ideological difference among the judges cuts along the lines of conserva-
tive/non-conservative.
72. The survey asked: "Do you believe you've had a jury use a verdict to send a mes-
sage about a broader political, ethical, or social subject?" The results were: Yes [Federal =
234 (39.4%), Texas = 182 (46.3%)], No [Federal = 354 (59.6%), Texas = 208 (52.9%)], and
No Answer [Federal = 6 (1.0%), Texas = 3 (0.8%)].
73. The survey asked: "Have you ever had what you considered a runaway jury?" The
results were: Yes [Federal = 137 (23.1%), Texas = 90 (22.9%)], No [Federal = 454 (76.4%),
Texas = 299 (76.1%)], and No Answer [Federal = 3 (0.5%), Texas = 4 (1.0%)].
74. N: Federal judges = 594; Texas judges = 393.
75. A total of 85 cases were omitted from the analysis due to missing observations.
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eral judges are more likely than Texas state court judges to support this
position.
The impact that the independent variables have on predicting the de-
pendent variable cannot be interpreted directly from the results of a lo-
gistic regression model. To assess their meaning, we calculated a range of
probabilities. 76 One indication of the explanatory strength of a logistic
regression model is the spread between the lowest and highest probabili-
ties-that is, the greater the spread, the better the model explains the
dependent variable. Table 5 reflects probabilities calculated based on the
model's results for the model as a whole and for each independent varia-
ble.77 The model as a whole has a sizable spread, which reflects that this
model provides a useful way to understand which judges likely would
support restricting the use of a jury in a civil dispute. Also note that
CONSERVATIVE, FEDSTATE, and RUNAWAY had approximately
equal spreads among their respective probabilities. This indicates that
they are each relatively equal predictors of the dependent variable. Al-
though MESSAGE is not as strong a predictor, it does contribute to the
model's explanatory power.
TABLE 5: PROBABILITIES CALCULATED FOR MODEL AND
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Model CONSERVATIVE FEDSTATE MESSAGE RUNAWAY
Prob0  10.60% 19.74% 16.95% 20.67% 21.00%
Probmea 23.57% 23.57% 23.57% 23.57% 23.57%
Prob, 54.88% 31.08% 28.83% 27.92% 33.50%
Spread 44.29% 11.35% 11.89% 7.25% 12.50%
Another aspect to consider is the rate of change as one moves from the
low to mean to high probabilities, as reflected in Table 6. This analysis
allows us to map out where each variable is located on the logistic regres-
sion S-curve; this indicates the relative effect of each independent varia-
ble on a judge's position regarding restricting or eliminating the trial by
jury in civil cases. For CONSERVATIVE, MESSAGE, and RUNAWAY,
the differential of Probmean-Probl is greater than the differential between
Prob-ProbMean. Thus, these variables are lower on the S-curve, but also
at a point where the presence of one of these variables starts to have an
increasing effect on knowing whether a judge would support restricting
jury usage. This is particularly true for CONSERVATIVE and RUN-
AWAY, where the difference between the two differentials is significantly
76. To do this, we multiplied the beta coefficients in the logistic regression equation
with the dichotomous values of the independent variables and their mean values. The
formula for calculating the probability that a judge would support restricting or eliminating
an individual's right to a jury trial in a civil dispute is:
p=1/(l+e-(o I [PI(CONSERVAT1VE) , P2(FEI)STATE) + P3(MESSAGE) + P4(RUNAWAY)))
77. In calculating the probabilities for each independent variable, the mean responses
for the other independent variables were used.
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greater.78 Conversely, the differentials for FEDSTATE reflect that it is
near the top of the S-curve, given that the Probo-ProbMea, differential is
greater than that for ProbMC,,,-Probl. As a result, the FEDSTATE varia-
ble reflects a form of diminishing returns; although knowing whether a
judge is a Federal or Texas state judge adds to the explanatory power of
the model, its effect is not as significant as the other variables, particu-
larly CONSERVATIVE and RUNAWAY.
TABLE 6: PROBABILITIES DIFFERENTIALS
[ CONSERVATIVE FEDSTATE MESSAGE RUNAWAYProbo-PrbM,.. 3.83% 6.62% 2.90% 2.57%
ProbMfa-Probl 1 7.52% 5.27% 4.35% 9.94%
D. MAKING THE MODEL SPEAK: INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
As noted above, each of the independent variables was statistically sig-
nificant and in a positive direction. Given the spread of probabilities for
CONSERVATIVE and RUNAWAY and their positions on the logistic
regression S-curve, these variables provide slightly more explanatory
power than the other two variables. We shall briefly analyze the findings
for each independent variable. We will save the discussion of CON-
SERVATIVE's findings for last because we believe that this analysis mer-
its special consideration.
In some regards, MESSAGE and RUNAWAY address a similar con-
cept: the issue of whether juries go beyond their obligations related to the
specific case for which they sit. Judges who have seen a jury that has
sought to extend itself beyond the case at hand, either by sending a
broader message or being a runaway jury, would be more likely to want
to see juries reigned in somewhat. This is a logical response to a problem
that they encountered.
An important difference, however, exists between the two variables,
and this may account for the fact that RUNAWAY appears to be a better
explanatory variable than MESSAGE. A jury that sends a broader mes-
sage is not necessarily forsaking its obligations to the judicial process in
doing so. For example, if a jury is allowed to choose damages in a lawsuit
from a range of values, it can send a message by selecting a value at either
the high or low end of the range and still be operating within the legal
limits prescribed to it. But such is not the case for a runaway jury, which
by definition is presumed to be acting beyond its legal authority. If a
judge perceived runaway juries as a problem within the legal system, then
one proper response to the problem would be to restrict the scope of the
jury system.
78. For CONSERVATIVE, the ProbMe,-Probi differential is approximately twice the
Probo-ProbMe, differential. For RUNAWAY, this greater differential is almost four times
the lower differential.
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Turning to FEDSTATE, federal judges are more likely than Texas state
judges to support restricting or eliminating an individual's right to a jury
trial in a civil case. First, consider the role of the trial by jury in Texas
specifically and at the state level more generally. The Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial in civil cases, designed to apply solely to the
federal government, has not been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, as have other provisions in the Bill of Rights. Thus, as they
were in 1791, states are permitted to develop their own standards for us-
ing juries in civil disputes. In Texas, the constitutional right to trial by
jury is much stronger than that of the federal Constitution. This right is
considered "inviolate" and the state legislature is directed to "maintain
its purity and efficiency."'79 One would expect that this stronger constitu-
tional preference for jury trials would be reflected in the view of Texas
judges. Moreover, even if a Texas judge were to believe personally that
jury trials in civil cases should be restricted, the Texas constitutional lan-
guage seemingly would limit a judge's ability to effect such a view. In
addition, state judges are much more likely to be connected to their im-
mediate community than federal judges, particularly in states like Texas
where judges are elected. The survey showed that Texas judges were
more likely than Federal judges to consider a jury to be the "conscience
of the community. '80 As shown above, judges who hold this view were
not likely to support restricting the use of a jury.
The second way to assess the FEDSTATE results is to view them from
a federal judge's perspective. The historical test used for interpreting the
Seventh Amendment may tend to favor the use of jury trials81, but it does
provide more leeway than, for example, the Texas constitution to get
around the jury system. Doing so may be important for federal judges
given their increased caseload pressure. Because trials before a judge
generally are heard and decided more quickly than a trial by jury82, re-
stricting the use of the right to trial by jury would be one way to ease this
pressure.8 3 Finally, federal judges hear cases on federal questions, as de-
fined in Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. The Federalists'
perception of civil cases involving federal questions was that juries were
not necessarily required to be used; moreover in some cases they should
not be. 84 Such a position may be resounding today in the views held by
some federal judges.
79. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The
Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its
purity and efficiency.").
80. See supra Section III.B.
81. See Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 593 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme
Court's "application of the [historical test] analysis in some cases may seem biased in favor
of jury trials").
82. See Posner Evidence, supra note 22, at 1491 ("In the federal courts, civil jury trials
are on average more than twice as long as civil bench (that is, judge) trials.").
83. This would, however, provide additional work for judges to render and write their
opinions. See id.
84. Hamilton wrote, "I feel a deep and deliberate conviction that there are many cases
in which the trial by jury is an ineligible one." FEDERALISr 83, supra note 1, at 504.
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The variable CONSERVATIVE requires special consideration. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, a judge who considered him- or herself to
be conservative in interpreting the law is more likely to support restrict-
ing or eliminating the right of individuals to have their civil disputes de-
cided by a jury. The term "conservative" is a broad label, and legal
conservatism can take many different forms.
Conservative judges often will place great weight on the beliefs that the
Framers of the Constitution held. Sometimes this weight takes the guise
of strict constructionalism or original intent, or conservative judges may
place their credence in the nation's traditions and values.85 This view as
it relates to the right to trial by jury can be found in Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore:
It may be that if this Nation were to adopt a new Constitution today,
the Seventh Amendment guaranteeing the right of jury trial in civil
cases in federal courts would not be included among its provisions.
But any present sentiment to that effect cannot obscure or dilute our
obligation to enforce the Seventh Amendment, which was included
in the Bill of Rights in 1791 and which has not since been repealed in
the only manner provided by the Constitution for repeal of its
provisions.86
Justice Rehnquist also contended that the "values that underlie the Sev-
enth Amendment" should be kept in mind when a court approaches the
decision of whether a jury trial is required in a civil case.87
Despite the strong emphasis on tradition and history sometimes found
in conservative legal thinking, the survey showed that conservative judges
tended to be more likely to support restricting the use of a jury trial than
non-conservative judges. Thus, the obvious question is why this is so.
The likely answer rests in the fact that legal conservatism can and does
take on many different forms. One line of conservative thinking goes to
the heart of the problems associated with jury trials better than the ab-
stract appreciation for the Founders that Rehnquist expressed.
Another strand of legal conservatism, generally speaking, seeks to pro-
mote efficiency and certainty in judicial proceedings. The problem with
juries is that they are inefficient and uncertain. 88 Jury trials are time-
85. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 594 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor
and Scalia, JJ.) ("But the judgment of our own times is not always preferable to the lessons
of history. Our whole constitutional experience teaches that history must inform the judi-
cial inquiry. Our obligation to the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, no less than the
compact we have with the generation that wrote them for us, do not permit us to disregard
provisions that some may think to be mere matters of historical form.").
86. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 338 (Rehinquist, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis in the original).
87. Id. at 344.
88. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the
Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 486, 488 (1975) ("As a practi-
cal matter, use of a jury in civil cases may present serious problems-most notably, delay,
jury prejudice, and questionable jury competence in more complex cases").
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consuming89, require the formulation and application of special rules90 ,
and impose external costs on the private litigants.91 Moreover, "the ju-
rors' inexperience and naivet6 will reduce the likelihood of an outcome
that corresponds to the true facts of the case."' 92 One way to reduce this
inefficiency and uncertainty would be to restrict or eliminate the trial by
jury in civil cases. Given this, we believe that this efficiency strand of
legal conservatism underlies the results of the CONSERVATIVE varia-
ble; the desire to streamline the judicial process presumably outweighed
the conservative judges' likely appreciation for tradition.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE JURY
SYSTEM IN CIVIL CASES
The issue of whether to restrict the right to trial by jury in civil cases is
somewhat of a paradox. On one hand, support for doing so among the
current judiciary is a minority position. Furthermore, the judges' percep-
tion as to the jury's effectiveness in reaching legal decisions would not
seem to indicate a need for fundamental reform of the judicial process.
On the other hand, however, the call for restricting the use of the jury
existed at the Founding, continued throughout the years since then, and
maintains itself today in what is at least a significant minority of the cur-
rent judiciary. In addition, many prominent jurists and legal scholars of
the past century or so have criticized or opposed the use of the jury sys-
tem: James Bradley Thayer, Learned Hand, Benjamin Cardozo, Jerome
Frank, Warren Burger, and Richard Posner, to name just a few. 93 Thus,
the issue of restricting the use of trial by jury is one that likely will not go
away anytime soon.
Without a doubt, the jury as a legal institution is inefficient and costly.
Even the jury system's most ardent supporters going back to the Federal
Farmer and Tocqueville have acknowledged this shortcoming. But the
jury system, at least at the time of the Founding, had a distinct purpose as
a political institution as well. The question with which we need to con-
cern ourselves, therefore, is whether the jury still has such a purpose in
the modern American political and legal system.
The jury system's critics tend to see the jury's political role as a histori-
89. See supra note 86.
90. See Posner Evidence, supra note 22, at 1491 (acknowledging the costs associated
with "[t]he rules of evidence... [which] would be largely unnecessary if there were no jury
trials; they are mainly designed to protect laymen from making cognitive errors as a result
of inexperience").
91. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 135.
92. Posner Evidence, supra note 22, at 1492. Judge Posner also notes "[n]ot only do
the jurors have higher information costs than professional judges do, but they also may be
more subject to cognitive illusions and emotionalism than a professional judge who has
'seen it all before'." Id.
93. See FRANK, supra note 19, at 124 (quoting Thayer, Hand, and Cardozo); Dooley,
supra note 16, at 346 (discussing Chief Justice Burger's views on civil juries); Posner Evi-
dence, supra note 22, at 1487-1500 (criticizing juries for the costs they impose, but also




cal artifact.94 A modern democratic system does not require the use of a
jury in civil cases, as evidenced by the fact that the United States is the
only country that regularly uses juries in this way.95 Moreover, even if
juries play a role in educating the citizenry (a proposition critics view
skeptically), the benefits of that role are not likely to outweigh the costs
imposed by the jury system. As Judge Posner contends, "The direct cost
of jury trials plainly exceeds that of bench trials. Only if a great deal of
value is assigned to John Stuart Mill's 'education in citizenship' rationale,
or to some other political value of jury trial, are the added costs likely to
be offset by greater benefits. ''96 Thus, the issue boils down to distinct
legal costs versus intangible and possibly nonexistent political benefits,
with the preference being to reduce the legal costs.
The jury system, however, even in civil cases remains an essential com-
ponent in the American republic. 97 The American experiment may have
proved successful, but that does not obviate the need to protect the fun-
damental tenets of liberty embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. This protection not only includes the assurance of a civil trial by
jury, but also the jury's right-the community's right-to have its declara-
tions of fact stand and not be reexamined by far-removed appellate
courts.
An individual's access to a trial by jury in civil cases is not just a facet
of the judicial process; at both the federal and state levels, it is a constitu-
tional right. It also is, as Tocqueville noted, far more: an expression of
popular sovereignty, a connection between the governors and the gov-
erned, and a tool of education. Perhaps because America does not now
face the immediacy of a tyrannical government or the threat of a fragile,
new nation failing, we take the jury's political roles for granted. But the
fact that the country is secured in its liberty does not lessen the impor-
tance of the jury as a political institution or as a purveyor of community
values.
We have lost the notion of juries as a vital organ of legitimacy. Caught
up in troubling concerns, such as out-of-control juries, preemptions being
used for the wrong reasons, judges overruling outcomes, and lack of rep-
resentation of the community, some are quick to call for the elimination
of trial by jury. These critics have forgotten what the trial by jury really
provides our limited republic driven by popular sovereignty. They have
forgotten that the trial by jury is more than mere window-dressing, more
than a mere drag on the judicial process. Juries are a key foundation and
political institution that not only confers legitimacy on judgments by
94. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 619 (4th ed. 1992)("An important aspect of the separation of powers (at least historically) is the requirement
that randomly selected private citizens (i.e., jurors) concur in the imposition of a criminal
sanction or the award of civil damages") (emphasis added).
95. See id. at 582.
96. See Posner Evidence, supra note 22, at 1502.
97. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (re-
ferring to "the essential guarantee of the Seventh Amendment").
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elites, but also allows the community the ability to stay a part of the gov-
erning process and for individuals to feel a part of and participate in the
development of government itself. These juries are a vital point of access
that permits ordinary citizens to appreciate the power of government first
hand. They also provide the average citizen with the ability to control the
development of the fundamental principles that will guide the commu-
nity. It is this latter power that fosters an appreciation in jurors that their
decision does not affect just one case, but the development of law and in
turn the community in general. As Justice Rehnquist argued, "Trial by a
jury of laymen rather than by the sovereign's judges was important to the
founders because juries represent the layman's common sense, the 'pas-
sional elements in our nature,' and thus keep the administration of law in
accord with the wishes and feelings of the community."'98 With all these
benefits that the jury system provides, to quote Justice Brennan (and
cover the full range of the ideological spectrum), "If ... a tie breaker is
needed, let us break the tie in favor of jury trial."99
But what of the flaws we have seen reported above? Certainly, the
jury is an imperfect institution, and its benefits not fully realized; such is
the nature of our system of government. But are the savings in efficiency
and certainty that would be gained by curtailing or eliminating the civil
jury trial so great that we should do so? Looking back at the Founding
Debate the answer would be no.
Those advocating the jury's demise generally see only the judicial
processes that have been developed through practice and convention.
These processes can be reformed without eliminating the benefits that
juries offer the American political system.100 Although an examination
of how to reform these processes is beyond the scope of this article, suf-
fice it to say that jury outcomes are only as good as the time, effort, and
education that are given to the juries. Going through the motions of de-
liberation with a jury who is ill-equipped, ill-informed, and ill-instructed
will yield the less-than-satisfactory results that the media and opponents
love to lament. Juries who are not allowed to learn from their experi-
ence, ask questions, nor even treated with the respect their power and
authority deserves are bound to fall short of our expectations. Any re-
form of the jury system needs to equip, inform, and instruct jurors to help
them improve their participation in the legal process, but it cannot and
should not limit or terminate their participation altogether.
We have forgotten the lesson that in order for the governed to confer
legitimacy on the process, all citizens must be able to participate in the
98. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 344 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver Wendell
Holmes); see also ADLER, supra note 19, at 186 ("More than when they vote, or pay taxes,
or attend a parade, [jurors] are realizing the democratic vision that still sustains our nation:
They are governing themselves").
99. Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 580 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
100. See, e.g., Posner Evidence, supra note 22, at 1498-99 (offering eight general reforms
"designed to make trial by jury more accurate").
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process. The echoes of the Founding Debate remind us that participation
is not a duty, but a precious right that must be nurtured and developed.
For popular sovereignty and representative government to mean any-
thing, it must have a foundation of people willing to guide, develop, and
nurture its path. The trial by jury is a much-maligned institution, which in
fact should be venerated for the legitimacy it confers. Reforms of the
trial-by-jury system have skewed this meaning and lulled many into call-
ing for restricting its scope. To these advocates it should be noted, the
jury is a means for the ordinary citizens to express themselves in relation
to the power of the state. This ultimate show of popular sovereignty is for
the people alone to confer and alone to lose.
